Touro Law Review
Volume 12
Number 3 New York State constitutional
Decisions: 1995 Compilation

Article 59

1996

Searches and Seizures

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Courts Commons, and the Fourth Amendment Commons

Recommended Citation
(1996) "Searches and Seizures," Touro Law Review: Vol. 12: No. 3, Article 59.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss3/59

This New York State Constitutional Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @
Touro Law Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touro Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ Touro Law Center. For more information, please contact lross@tourolaw.edu.

et al.: Searches and Seizures

1996]

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

1149

because the petitioner's job was "safety sensitive," the reasonable
suspicion requirement could be circumvented. 2 68
In conclusion, the Briggs court held that regardless of what the
petitioner's personal beliefs were with regard to the return-towork drug policy, the petitioner was required to adopt the
position the agent had negotiated for his union. 269 Pursuant to the
collective bargaining agreement between the two entities, it was
agreed that the drug testing policy was permissible. 270 As a
result, 27 1 the petitioner's right to be free from an unreasonable
search pursuant to the Fourth Amendment was held not to be
infringed. Thus, citing to the Federal Constitution, Briggs stands
for the proposition that the New York State Constitution goes no
further than federal constitutional doctrine in protecting
employee's in "safety sensitive" jobs from drug testing.
People v. Owens 272
(decided February 3, 1995)
The defendant, charged with criminal possession of a
weapon, 273 moved to have evidence, specifically a gun and
several statements made to the arresting police officers,
suppressed. 274 The defendant argued that the evidence taken by
the police officers was gained during a "pre-text stop" of
defendant's vehicle, and as such, should not serve as a basis for
seizure of the gun or defendant's subsequent statements to the
police officers. 275 The court suppressed the evidence, holding
268. Briggs, 635 N.Y.S.2d at 688.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. 164 Misc. 2d 15, 623 N.Y.S.2d 719 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1995).
273. See N.Y. CIUM. PROC. LAw § 265.02 (McKinney 1989). This section
provides in pertinent part: "A person is guilty of criminal possession of a
weapon in the third degree when: ... (4) he possesses any loaded firearm."
Id.
274. Owens, 164 Misc. 2d at 15-16, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
275. Id. at 18, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
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that the stop of defendant's vehicle was, in fact, a pre-text stop
that violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment 276 right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures as guaranteed under
the United States Constitution. 277 Although the court excluded
the evidence of the gun and the defendant's statements, the court
issued a scathing indictment of the exclusionary rule and urged
the New York State Legislature and the New York Court of
2 78
Appeals to reconsider the rule.
Two police officers observed the defendant park his van and
enter a store known for criminal activity. 279 The officers then
observed the defendant exit the store, make an adjustment to his
waistband (consistent with adjusting a gun or possibly a harmless
gesture), and proceeded to follow the defendant. 280 While
following the defendant, the defendant failed to signal for a left
turn and the officers pulled his vehicle over. 2 81 As one officer
approached the car, he observed the defendant making "furtive"
movements and heard metal hitting metal. 282 The officer asked
the defendant to exit the van, and upon looking inside the van,
observed a gun. 2 83 The defendant was then placed under
arrest. 2 84
The court began its discussion by stating several well settled,
relevant propositions of law. First, a police officer may stop a
276. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

The Fourth Amendment provides in

pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.., but upon probable cause. . .

."

Id. A similar provision appears

in Article I, section 12 the N.Y. CONST. art I, § 12. This section provides in
pertinent part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.., but upon probable cause. . . ." Id. The Court in the present case
did not discuss the New York State Constitutional provisions as the Federal
exclusionary rule is well settled in case law.
277. Owens, 164 Misc. 2d at 18, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 16, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 17, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
282. Id. at 17, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 720-21.
283. Id. at 17, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
284. Id.
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vehicle for a traffic infraction. 2 85 Without a traffic infraction,
however, an officer may only stop a vehicle based on a
reasonable suspicion that the occupant has committed, is about to
commit, or is committing a crime. 2 86 Second, although a traffic
infraction may justify an officer in stopping a vehicle and even
arresting the occupant, 2 87 a routine stop for a traffic infraction
may not be used as the basis to search a vehicle. 2 88 Finally, the

court stated that "police officers may not use a traffic infraction
as a 'mere pre-text' to investigate the defendant on an unrelated

matter."289
285. Id. at 18, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 721 (citing People v. Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d
413, 414, 330 N.E.2d 39, 40, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67, 69 (1975)).
286. Owens, 164 Misc. 2d at 18, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 721. See People v.
Sobotker, 43 N.Y.2d 559, 563, 373 N.E.2d 1218, 1220, 402 N.Y.S.2d 993,
996 (1978) (finding that the stopping of a vehicle will result in an
impermissible seizure unless the police had a reasonable suspicion that an
occupant of the vehicle had committed, is committing or will commit an act in
violation of the law).
287. Owens, 164 Misc. 2d at 18, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 721. See N.Y. CR1i.
This statute provides in
PRoc. LAw § 140.10(1)(a) (McKinney 1992).
pertinent part: "a police officer may arrest a person for . . . [a]ny offense
when he has reasonable cause to believe that such person has committed such
offense in his presence .... " Id. See also N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 155
(McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995). This provision provides in pertinent part that
traffic violations "shall be deemed misdemeanors and all provisions of law
relating to misdemeanors ... shall apply." Id.
288. Owens, 164 Misc. 2d at 18, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 721. See People v.
Class, 63 N.Y.2d 491, 493, 472 N.E.2d 1009, 1010, 483 N.Y.S.2d 181, 182
(1984), rev'd, 475 U.S. 106 (1986) (holding that it is a violation of both the
Federal and New York State Constitutions for a police officer to enter a
vehicle without permission when the purpose of the stop was a traffic
infraction); People v. Guzman, 116 A.D.2d 528, 530, 497 N.Y.S.2d 675, 677
(1st Dep't 1986) (finding that when stopping a car for a traffic infraction it is
permissible for an officer to request that the driver step out of the vehicle, but
it is not permissible for him to search the interior without some prior notice of
criminality or danger).
289. Owens, 164 Misc. 2d at 18, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 721. See People v.
Melendez, 195 A.D.2d 856, 857, 600 N.Y.S.2d 776, 777 (3d Dep't 1993)
(stating that although a police officer may stop a vehicle for a traffic
infraction, he may not use this stop as a pretext for other unrelated purposes);
People v. Smith, 181 A.D.2d 802, 803, 581 N.Y.S.2d 240, 241 (2d Dep't
1992) (holding that in stopping a cab for an alleged traffic violation, the police
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The court determined that "the police may not use traffic

infractions to justify a stop of an individual when the police
action is motivated by other reasons, namely, some suspicion that
falls short of reasonable suspicion." 290 With that, the court held
that the officers in the present case had made a pre-text stop of
the defendant's vehicle, which was, "insufficient in law in this
State to serve as a predicate for the seizure of the gun involved
here. '' 29 1 The court noted that it was bound by law to suppress
the evidence in this case. 292 Although the exclusionary rule was

born out of the United States Supreme Court and subsequently
adopted by New York, the court felt that it was only bound by

used this infraction as a pretext to search the cab for items belonging to the
passenger); People v. Vasquez, 173 A.D.2d 580, 581, 570 N.Y.S.2d 164, 165
(2d Dep't), appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 1130, 586 N.E.2d 71, 578 N.Y.S.2d
888 (1991) (concluding that the police officers used the Vehicle and Traffic
Law as a pretext to search a double parked car and order the passengers from
the vehicle); People v. Camarre, 171 A.D.2d 1002, 1004, 569 N.Y.S.2d 223,
224 (4th Dep't), appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d 953, 578 N.E.2d 447, 573
N.Y.S.2d 649 (1991) (finding that an impermissible search and arrest resulted
where the record indicated that the police had decided to stop and arrest the
defendant before the alleged traffic violation occurred); People v. Watson, 157
A.D.2d 476, 549 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 75 N.Y.2d 971,
555 N.E.2d 628, 556 N.Y.S.2d 256 (1990) (stating that the evidence seized as
fruits of a traffic stop were inadmissible because the police were motivated to
stop the car based on their belief that criminal activity had ocurred); People v,
Mikel, 152 A.D.2d 603, 604-05, 543 N.Y.S.2d 712, 714 (2d Dep't 1989)
(holding that evidence obtained by police after they stopped a car based on the
fact that the passenger was not wearing a seat belt should be suppressed,
because the court determined the stop was a mere pretext for an interrogation
of the occupants); People v. Llopis, 125 A.D.2d 416, 417, 509 N.Y.S.2d 135,
136 (2d Dep't 1986) (holding that evidence seized pursuant to a traffic stop
should be suppressed because there was no indication in the record that the
police officer stopped the vehicle for the sole purpose of issuing a traffic
summons).
290. Owens, 164 Misc. 2d at 18, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
291. Id.
292. Id. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that evidence
gained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is not admissible). The court in
Owens was bound to suppress the evidence based on the precedent established
by Mapp and those subsequent New York cases that adopted the Mapp rule, as
authority for excluding evidence.
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"the mandates of current State law." 293
After this cursory treatment of the exclusionary rule, the court
embarked on a lengthy criticism of the rule. The court noted that
the rationale behind the rule was to prevent or deter police
officers from violating constitutional principles by suppressing
evidence seized in violation of the constitution. 294 However, the
court concluded that in the decades following the rule's adoption,
the rule has not effectuated this purpose because "it does not
deter police officers from violating what most of them view as
overly technical and unrealistic rules and thus does not protect
innocent citizenry from unconstitutional intrusion." 295 The court
reasoned that the rule only applies when contraband is found, and
therefore, ironically, the rule protects only the guilty, not the
innocent victim who has been intruded upon by a search that does
not find contraband. 296
The court noted that an unintended consequence of the
application of the exclusionary rule has resulted in police officers
and defendants "tailoring their testimony in a given case to meet
constitutional standards, rather than adher[ing] to them."297
However, the court failed to explain how the wrong-doing of the
police justifies weakening a rule that protects citizens from
constitutional infractions by the police. The court described
incidents in which officers would seize contraband that they knew
would be suppressed in court but viewed their actions as carrying
out their law enforcement mandate because whatever contraband
was seized was then off the streets. 298 "In any event, as
indicated, the result, as in the instant case, neither protects the
innocent nor does justice and this suppression rule which this
court is obliged to follow here, thus both fails in its attempt to
protect the citizenry and fails to deter unconstitutional police
action."299
293. Owens, 164 Misc. 2d1 at 18, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 721.
294. Id. at 19, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1996

5

Touro Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 3 [1996], Art. 59

1154

TO URO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 12

The court discussed a recent decision, People v. Nickelson,300
which similarly criticized the exclusionary rule. In Nickelson,
police officers observed the defendant entering a cab, and making
furtive movements in the passenger area. 30 1 Although the vehicle
had not violated any traffic laws, the officers pulled the cab over
because they suspected that the driver was going to be robbed by
the passenger. 302 Upon inspection, the officers recovered a gun
from a magazine pouch behind the driver's seat. 303 The court
held that furtive movements could not amount to a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity and suppressed evidence of the
gun.304

The court stated that it "reluctantly" suppressed the evidence
based only upon appellate court holdings that furtive movements
do not constitute reasonable suspicion. 305 Moreover, the court
expressed regret that it could not take into account the officers'
vast experience, training and judgment, indicating that this
judgment and experience is typically not given the weight it
deserves in the "sterile environment of a post-arrest judicial
assessment" 306 of the officers actions. 307 The Nickelson court
stated that the courts, in conducting these assessments, tend to
ignore those very character traits which, instead, should be given
the highest regard both by the judiciary and society. 308
The Nickelson court also noted that the United States "is the
only country in the western world to apply a mandatory
exclusionary rule that has the effect of barring the introduction of
objectively probative and relevant evidence." ' 309 The court
pointed out that other western countries balance such factors as
the seriousness of the officers' violation, the seriousness of the
300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.

N.Y. L.J., July 27, 1994, at 22.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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3 10
crime involved, and the effect of excluding the evidence.
The court, in Owens, not only complained of the rule's
application and its effects, but also suggested an alternative to the
rule. 3 11 The court discussed the United States Supreme Court
case of Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of FederalBureau
of Narcotics,3 12 which held that a cause of action exists for
damages suffered from a law enforcement agent's violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 3 13 In light of the Supreme Court's decision,
the Owens court suggested that a citizen who suffers an illegal
search and seizure may recover damages as a result of that search
and seizure, and that the mandatory exclusionary rule could be
replaced by balancing the seriousness of the crime involved
against the police actions. 3 14 The court supported this approach
because it would "better serve the needs of society and the
315
individual."
The Owens court concluded its analysis by discussing the
absolute suppression rule. 3 16 The court stated that although both
the Federal and New York State Constitutions seek to provide
reasonable protection to both the guilty and the innocent, they
should not "lean over so far backward as to have justice fall flat

on its back." 3 17 In order to fully illustrate this fact, the court
referred to the current state of the absolute suppression rule in
3 18
New York today as "archaic."
The court stated that the rule serves more to protect the guilty
individual from charges of possession of guns, drugs, etc., and
from use of this evidence at trial than it does to protect the

310. Id.

311. Owens, 164 Misc. 2d at 22, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 724.
312. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).

313. Id. at 397 ("[W]e hold that petitioner is entitled to recover money
damages for any injuries he has suffered as a result of the agents violation of
the Amendment.").
314. Owens, 164 Misc. 2d at 22, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 724.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 21, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 723.
317. Id. at 21, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 724.
318. Id. at 21, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 723.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1996

7

Touro Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 3 [1996], Art. 59

1156

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 12

citizenry. 3 19 Moreover, the court indicated that the rule as it is
today is "worse than ineffective" 320 because it is providing
protection to the guilty. 321 The court also indicated that the
current rule is not acting as a deterrent to illegal police action
because the guilty are going unpunished and the victims are being
left without remedy. 322
Based on these conclusions the court urged the New York State
Court of Appeals and the New York State Legislature to
eliminate the absolute suppression rule as it stands today. 323 The
court stated that a practical remedy should be developed for those
individuals whose Fourth Amendment rights have been violated,
providing they are "also found not culpable." ' 324 Finally, the
Owens court pointed out that a remedy such as this would lead to
a more balanced approach to providing protections of individual
rights and the seizing of illegal contraband. 325
QUEENS COUNTY
People v. Woodson 326
(decided July 7, 1995)

The defendant argued that a urine sample, blood sample, and
medical records obtained while the defendant was unconscious in
a hospital, through a grand jury subpoena issued less than
319. Id. See Arizona v. Evans, 866 P.2d 869, 871 (Ariz.), cert. granted,

114 S. Ct. 2131 (1994). Evans was one of those extraordinary cases which put
the exclusionary rule in a bad light. In Evans the Court suppressed drugs
seized by the police in the "execution of an arrest warrant" because the
warrant had been quashed a few days earlier, but a clerical error caused it to
remain in the police computer. Id. Therefore, despite the fact that the police
acted in good faith, the evidence was suppressed. Id.
320. Owens, 164 Misc. 2d at 22, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 723.
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 22-23, 623 N.Y.S.2d at 724.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. 165 Misc. 2d 784, 630 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1995).
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